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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

Office of Research and Reports

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MAPS

* Individual classification for each article in this Review is given at the end of the article.

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SOVIET-SPONSORED PLANS FOR COORDINATED MAPPING IN THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES

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The mapping and geodesy conference held in Sofia, Bulgaria, from 22 June to 1 July 1952 was sponsored nominally by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The USSR was represented by nine delegates, East Germany by two, and the other participating countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria) by three each. China and Albania were not represented or discussed.

Most of the delegates were high-ranking officers of the principal military mapping agencies of their respective countries, but each delegation included one or more civilians. In the source's opinion, only one of the Soviet delegates (a civilian) and the chief delegates of Hungary and Bulgaria were experts in higher geodesy, although the chief Soviet delegate, General Sudakov,* and one other Soviet general possessed "a good understanding" of geodesy. The Czech and Polish representatives were experienced in surveying and mapping but were not geodesists, and the head of the Rumanian delegation was an

*Source's transliteration.

astronomer. The chief German representative was untrained in any field related to surveying or mapping.

At the start of the meeting, the Soviet delegation was unanimously supported in a move that all documents pertaining to the proceedings be classified "Secret." Participants were not permitted to take written notes from the conference rooms, but it was announced that upon adjournment all the governments represented would receive copies of the minutes and supplementary materials.

Summoned on short notice, with little advance information regarding the agenda, the Satellite delegates were unable to prepare for the conference, whereas the Soviet delegation arrived with definite proposals that obviously had been carefully thought out. The keynote of the Soviet program was that the "people's democracies" and the Soviet Zone of Germany must work toward uniformity with the USSR in mapping and its geodetic basis. Proposed as essential steps for achieving the desired uniformity were the following: (1) adoption of the Krasovskiy ellipsoid; (2) use of the position of the observatory at Pulkovo (Leningrad) as datum for horizontal geodetic control;* (3) adoption of the zero of the tidal gauge at Kronshtadt (Leningrad) as sea-level datum; (4) maps to be prepared at the

*In assembling some of the earlier reports based on the source's information, interrogating officers erroneously concluded that the Pulkovo meridian was to be used in place of Greenwich as the prime meridian on Soviet and Satellite maps. An article pointing out the error of this conclusion appeared in Map Intelligence Review 37S-7, September 1953.

scales of 1:25,000, 1:50,000, 1:100,000, 1:200,000, 1:500,000, and 1:1,000,000; (5) maps at scales larger than 1:1,000,000 to be constructed on the Gauss-Krüger projection (6° strips); (6) maps at the scale of 1:1,000,000 to be drawn on the modified polyconic projection of the International Map of the World; (7) adoption of the Soviet sheet lines and sheet-numbering system based on the layout of the International Map of the World; (8) use of the Soviet conventional symbols; and (9) intensified development and use of aerial photography.

Virtually all of the Soviet recommendations were accepted unanimously. The one exception pertained to the use of 6° Gauss-Krüger projection strips for all maps. Upon hearing the objections of delegates from East Germany and Bulgaria, the Soviets agreed that the 6° strips need be used only for maps at the scale of 1:25,000 or smaller and that 3° strips would be satisfactory for maps at scales larger than 1:25,000.*

The resolutions formally adopted at the end of the conference restated the original Soviet proposals and also covered certain other points. Noteworthy among the latter are the following: (1) by December 1955, each country to make temporary adjustments in its

*As far as is known, maps at scales larger than 1:25,000 are not now required by the Soviet program, but if such maps are prepared they must conform to Soviet specifications. The source believed that only East Germany and Bulgaria are currently preparing maps at scales larger than 1:25,000.

presently used (i.e., used prior to the Sofia conference) horizontal and vertical control data to bring it into accord with the Soviet system, final adjustment of the data to be completed by 1957; (2) first priority to be given to the production of maps at the scale of 1:25,000, with coverage at all scales larger than 1:1,000,000 (1:25,000, 1:50,000, 1:100,000, 1:200,000, and 1:500,000) to be completed by December 1959; (3) the Helmert 1901-9 gravity formula to be used until a new formula has been developed; (4) conferences to be held from time to time to appraise the progress of the work.

It was made apparent to the Satellite delegates early in the conference proceedings that they had been summoned solely for the purpose of receiving instructions. Such "discussion" as took place consisted mostly of explanations by the Soviets of their standards aand specifications. Relations between the Soviet and Satellite delegates were not cordial, and several Satellite representatives privately voiced anti-Soviet sentiments. That the anti-Soviet feelings of the personnel of the Satellite mapping agencies might lead to intentional carelessness in executing the Soviet plan is within the realm of possibility.

An exchange of geodetic information between the Soviet-bloc countries was agreed upon at the Sofia meeting, but it will be limited to data for first-order points in border areas of adjoining countries. For example, Bulgaria will receive data on border points from Rumania; Rumania will receive similar data from Bulgaria,

Hungary, and the USSR; and so on. The source assumes that the Soviet Union alone will receive complete data from all of the countries.

In the reports presenting the information, the data on military grids are confused to some extent with the information on map projections. There is every reason to believe, however, that the maps prepared to meet the Sofia conference specifications will carry the Soviet (6° strip) Gauss-Krüger military grid.

From any viewpoint, the Soviet mapping program for the Satellites must be considered a formidable undertaking. If fulfilled on schedule, a belt about 1,000 miles long and 200 to 600 miles wide will be mapped with a uniformity and precision rare for areas of comparable size. Possession of this large block of up-to-date coverage would give the Soviet Union many military and economic advantages. The maps would be of inestimable value, for instance, in guided-missile warfare, and they would also aid greatly in exploiting the resources of the various countries. Communist plans, however, are often scaled well above production capabilities, and it is not unlikely that the program will run behind schedule or will be reduced in scope at some future date.

The production problems that can be foreseen vary somewhat from country to country. In East Germany, a shortage of trained draftsmen, cartographers, and surveyors looms as a serious handicap. On the other hand, the Germans probably will be able to make more use

of their old maps than will the other countries, for they have long used a 3°-strip Gauss-Krüger projection, and the difference between their old leveling datum and the Kronshtadt figure is not great enough to require reinterpretation of contours. Poland, like East Germany, will not be seriously affected by the change in leveling datum, but serious problems may be encountered in bringing the diverse Polish horizontal triangulation networks into accord with the Soviet system. It is likely that some of the existing maps of Poland can be revised and adapted readily to the Soviet specifications. At the Sofia meeting, the delegates of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria indicated to the source in private conversation that they would have trouble meeting their deadlines because the change to Kronshtadt leveling datum would require reinterpretation of the contours on existing maps, an enormous compilation job. Czechoslovakia and Hungary may be able to adjust their horizontal triangulation networks to the Soviet system without meeting unusual problems, but adjustment of the three separate networks of Rumania is not likely to be a simple matter. Bulgaria adopted the Krasovskiy ellipsoid in 1951 and, presumably, will be able to adjust its horizontal triangulation to the Soviet system without undue difficulty.

Although the Soviet proposals at the Sofia meeting stressed the importance of intensified development and use of aerial photography and photogrammetry, these subjects were not discussed at length and no specific plans or schedules were outlined. At the time of the

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[redacted] the mapping agencies of East Germany had not yet been granted permission by the Soviets to fly aerial photography and were not prepared to make extensive use of photography if permission had been forthcoming.

As far as is known, maps produced to meet the conference specifications will carry a single legend in the language of the publishing country. It would, however, be a relatively simple matter for the Soviet Union to prepare Russian-language editions of any of the maps should this appear necessary or desirable. No action was taken at the Sofia meeting on division of responsibility for border sheets, and nothing was said about preparing maps covering areas west of the Iron Curtain.

The Soviet representatives at the Sofia conference were quite free in assuring the delegates of the Satellite countries that help from the USSR would be forthcoming in the form of technical assistance, equipment, and control data needed to effect adjustments. The scope of the assistance that is actually given will be a valuable clue to the importance that the Soviets attach to the mapping of the area along their western frontier. (SECRET)

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in content and sometimes disagree on details. In cases of disagreement, the version of the later and more carefully prepared reports (1, 2, and 3) was accepted.

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SETTLEMENT OF THE ÉVROS (MARITSA) RIVER BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY BETWEEN BULGARIA AND GREECE

A small but concrete result of last summer's Soviet Bloc "peace offensive" was the demarcation of a permanent boundary between Bulgaria and Greece in the 9 1/2-mile stretch where the Evros (Maritsa) River forms the frontier between the two countries. During border disturbances of preceding years, many of the boundary markers along the Bulgarian-Greek boundary had been destroyed, and the Évros River islets, long in dispute because of the unstable nature of the river, had been the scenes of bloody clashes. The Greek Government had proposed several years earlier that a mixed commission be appointed to settle the boundary question, but the offer was not accepted by the Bulgarians until June 1953. The bits of real estate involved in the controversy over the Évros boundary were of little consequence, but the controversy itself and the way in which it was settled demonstrate once again the inadequacy of rivers as international boundaries, particularly if the river is a braided stream with widely shifting channels. Definite fixing of the boundary should remove a source of irritation in relations between Greece and Bulgaria if both sides continue to respect the new line.

The Évros section of the boundary was defined only in general terms at the end of World War I. The Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine of 1919 stated that the boundary should follow the principal course of

the Évros. It further provided that in the case of a non-navigable boundary stream such as the Évros the principal course should be considered as the "median line of the waterway or of its principal branch," and that the boundary commission entrusted with the task of demarcating the boundary should specify whether the boundary line should follow any changes of course or channel that might take place or whether the line should be definitely fixed by the position of the course or channel at the time the treaty came into effect. The demarcation commission established the position of boundary markers on the bank of the river at the point where the line meets the river and again at the point, several miles upstream, where the line leaves the river. Between these two points the commission determined that the line should follow the "principal course of the Maritza [sic]." The channel of the river presumably selected by the commission as the "principal course" is indicated on the boundary demarcation maps (scale 1:25,000) by a dashed boundary symbol. From the records now available, it is not clear that the commission followed the instructions of the treaty to determine whether the boundary should change with changes in the channel or should remain fixed.

In the section where it corresponds with the Bulgarian-Greek boundary the Évros flows between well-defined banks lined by willow trees, but the bed of the stream is divided into a number of channels. All except one of these are dry stretches of sand throughout most of the year. Between these channels lie sandbars and higher areas

covered with scrubby vegetation. In winter, when the river is in flood, all of the channels carry water and the higher areas become islets; but during most of the year the higher areas are separated from the Bulgarian or Greek bank of the river only by stretches of sand, and the small amount of water in the stream is generally confined to one small channel. At the time the boundary was demarcated, this main channel seems to have lain for the most part on the south, or Greek side of the river, thus placing most of the so-called islets on the Bulgarian side of the boundary. Later there were changes in the main channel, and after 1940 the main flow of the stream was close to the Bulgarian bank, placing the islets in Greece.

In the interwar period, the disputes that occurred over the possession of some of the islets either were settled amicably or were of such a minor nature as to be of no consequence in the general relations between the two countries. Only after this boundary had become a segment of the Iron Curtain and Bulgarian-Greek relations as a whole had deteriorated did the islets become a source of major difficulty. In the cases of several of the disputed islets the Greeks took the position that, since the main river channel had changed, the two countries should designate a joint commission to define a permanent boundary along the Évros, whereas the Bulgarians seem to have considered that the boundary should remain in the old main channel regardless of the changes and that the appointment of a boundary commission was unnecessary.

The largest of the disputed islets is Alpha (Greek, Álfa; Bulgarian, Gornia), which is roughly 1,700 yards long and is located a short distance upstream from the Bulgarian village of Generalovo (see accompanying CIA map 13239). Apparently it had been cultivated by Bulgarians when the main channel ran to the south of the islet, separating it from the Greek shore, and the Bulgarians had continued to cultivate it after the channel shifted to the north side. Alpha was the scene of border clashes in 1948, 1949, and 1950 after occupation by Bulgarian armed forces. In September 1950 the Bulgarians constructed a picket and stone dam from the Bulgarian bank to the upstream end of the islet in an attempt to divert the flow of water back into the old main channel to the south. This attempt was unsuccessful, and in the following months several breaks developed in the dam. The Greeks alleged that the Bulgarians violated previous boundary agreements by attempting to annex the islet and by trying to alter the natural features of the stream without prior agreement by both parties. In 1951 the Greeks protested the harvesting of a crop from the islet by the Bulgarians, but the latter continued to assert their sovereignty over the area.

A group of islets downstream from Alpha was the scene of incidents in 1952. These include two islets designated by the Greeks as

Anonymous (Anónimos) and Gámma.* The upper portion of Anonymous seems to have been regarded as Bulgarian and the lower part as Greek by customary usage. Judging from the boundary demarcation maps, Gámma did not exist in 1921 at the time of the boundary determination. Later, it seems to have been used, for pasturing stock and for wood-cutting, by the Greeks but never by the Bulgarians, and according to some sources the main channel of the Évros had passed to the north of Gámma for a long period. In 1952 Bulgarians occupied both Anonymous and Gámma and prevented Greeks from crossing them or the dry sand between them in order to water their cattle in the main channel to the north. Most of the Bulgarians withdrew from Gámma after Greek forces brought the islet under heavy fire.

A boundary commission composed of representatives of both Bulgaria and Greece started work in the summer of 1953, and the agreement embodying the results of its labors was signed in Salonika (Thessaloníki) on 30 December 1953. The commission was charged with the task of restoring the boundary markers along the entire Greek-

*The exact identity of the islets designated by the names Anonymous and Gámma is not clear from the sources available. Each of these names may, in fact, cover a group of islets and sandbanks instead of a single islet. Confusion probably arises in part because of the changes in channels. The situation is not helped, moreover, by the fact that the Greeks employ for the islets a system of numbering from east to west in addition to their system of lettering. The accompanying map shows both the Greek letter and number designations. It is based on [redacted] and is believed to be substantially correct.

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Bulgarian boundary, but its main work involved the settling of the Évros River sector. The commission took advantage of the ambiguities and alternative choices presented by the 1919-21 settlement to change the principle upon which the river boundary was determined. Since the Treaty of Neuilly had stated that the line might follow the "median line of the waterway or of its principal branch," the commission interpreted the treaty in such a way that the boundary would follow the median line of the entire width of the river from main bank to main bank, thus ignoring the position of main and secondary channels. It was decided, however, that the boundary should deviate from the median line to include in one country or the other islets or parts of islets that had been used or occupied by the nationals of that country. Boundary pyramids were to be placed at intervals along the line in the stream, and for each pyramid there was to be an additional marker on either bank, so that the position of a pyramid could be determined even though the pyramid itself should be washed away. The positions of the new line and the pyramids are shown on the accompanying map. Under the agreement, Greece receives Beta (Vita), most of Anonymous and Gámma, and about half the Bulgarian-Greek portion of Number 1 islet, located at the southernmost point of the Évros River sector where this boundary meets the Turkish boundary. Bulgaria receives all of Alpha except a small portion nearest the Greek bank and all of a number of other islets that were not subject to active dispute in recent years.



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The political opposition within Greece has claimed that the government gave up some of the national territory in this settlement. The claims and counterclaims in this respect are difficult to assess, but it seems that on Alpha and Number 1 islets at least Greece secured gains over its 1921 holdings. More important to Greece, however, than these small sandbanks is the fixing of a definite boundary in the river and the demonstration that, after a long period of intransigence, Bulgaria has finally shown, in this case at least, a willingness to be reasonable. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CESSATION OF WORK ON THE DANUBE-BLACK SEA CANAL

From early 1949 to August 1953, propaganda organs in the Soviet Orbit countries extolled construction of the Danube-Black Sea Canal in Rumania as a prime example of Communist beneficence. The plans envisage a 40-mile canal between Capul Midia on the Black Sea and Cernavoda on the Danube that would shorten the water route to the Black Sea by approximately 140 miles and would aid in the development of the arid, sparsely populated Dobruja. Some 100,000 hectares of arid land near the canal route were to be irrigated, malarial swamps were to be drained, industrial plants were to be constructed, and new ports were to be developed. All of Danubian Europe thus would benefit indirectly from the canal. Billions of lei were poured into the project and thousands of "volunteer" laborers were employed on a round-the-clock basis. After 4 years of construction activity, the project was suddenly abandoned although the canal was less than one-fourth complete. That the Communists would dare to stop work on the canal after making it a vital symbol of "socialist accomplishment" has caused speculation as to the possible reasons -- particularly since the Soviet Union took much credit for initiating and directing the project.

To date, no explicit statement of reasons is known to have been made public by either Rumanian or Soviet officials. Most conjectures on the matter have attributed the cessation of work to the new Soviet

economic policy calling for increased production of consumer goods and less emphasis on public works and heavy industry. Although stoppage of work appears to be in harmony with the new policy, there is reason to doubt that the policy itself was the primary cause.

Considerable evidence has been found indicating that deficiencies in the fundamental surveys for the canal led to grave engineering errors and the eventual abandonment of the project. No adequate large-scale geologic, soils, or topographic maps of the area were available at the outset. A report received in 1949 stated that the data on hand for the planning of the canal consisted of topographic maps at scales of 1:20,000 and 1:100,000, special surveys at 1:5,000 of some sectors of the canal route (the Carasu Valley, Lake Taşaul, Constanţa, and the Danube in the region of Hingo Island), and some hydrological data on flow and seasonal water levels of the Danube. In addition, some 114 geologic drillings were made in 1949 along the proposed route of the canal and analyzed in the geotechnical laboratory of the Canal Administration.

The topographic maps mentioned as available are probably the old Rumanian 1:20,000 and 1:100,000 series, which are believed to be completely inadequate for the detailed planning required. Of the 1:5,000 special surveys mentioned, only the Carasu Valley survey would cover a significant segment of the actual canal route. In the absence of accurate large-scale geologic maps, it is doubtful whether the geologic drillings would provide sufficient data on soils and

geologic structure from which to develop a reliable project plan. Yet this type of data was apparently relied upon for drawing up the preliminary plans.

Between early 1952 and the date of cessation of the work, several reports were received indicating that rocky soils and unusually hard rock formations had been encountered unexpectedly at various points and had slowed construction progress markedly. A March 1952 report on a conference of the Rumanian Academy outlined plans for 1952, which included geological research and the preparation of new geological maps for the Danube-Black Sea Canal. The "unexpected" occurrence of rocky soils and the admitted need for geologic research and new geologic maps 3 years after work was started strongly suggest that the preliminary data were incomplete and unreliable.

The discovery of serious errors in the basic plans would have called for a reappraisal of the whole project and, very likely, a sharp upward revision of the time and cost estimates. Since the project as initially planned constituted a heavy drain on the Rumanian economy, the revised estimates may have ruled it out completely under the new economic policy.

The magnitude of the canal fiasco and reports indicating that erstwhile project directors (including the chief of the planning section) were convicted of "sabotage" suggest that the blood of more than a few scapegoats has moistened the arid soil of Dobruja. (SECRET)

CZECHOSLOVAK AND POLISH AERONAUTICAL CHARTS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

Several aeronautical charts used on aircraft that were flown out of Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1953 recently became available for examination. The Polish charts were carried by military (fighter) airplanes on training flights. The Czech charts, of which photocopies only were seen, were used by civil aircraft in routine city-to-city flights. Although these may not be the latest and most complete charts prepared in Czechoslovakia and Poland, they give a better idea of post-war aeronautical charting in the two countries than any other materials that have reached the West from Satellite countries.

The Czech charts include sheets giving incomplete coverage for the middle part of Czechoslovakia at 1:500,000 and approach or landing charts for scattered areas at a variety of larger scales. The 1:500,000 sheets, Wien (1949) and Tatry (1947), carry the series name, Letecká mapa Evropy (Aeronautical Map of Europe), and were published by the Zeměměřicky úřad (Land Survey Office). The base data include relief, shown by hypsometric tints and spot heights, and well-selected cultural information. Although the aeronautical data are limited to airfields, radio beacons, and isogonic lines, the charts appear adequate for pilotage and dead-reckoning navigation and compare favorably with the 1:500,000 charts published by the U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Chart and Information Center. The two charts differ slightly in content, civil airfields only being shown on the Wien sheet.

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[redacted] indicated that he had used the 1:500,000 charts for some 5 years and found them "of acceptable accuracy." It was noted that four 1:500,000 charts provide complete coverage for Czechoslovakia and that additional charts extend the coverage over other parts of Europe. 25X1A

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[redacted] that all Czech aeronautical charts are classified tajne (secret), whether for civil or military use; this classification, however, did not appear on the two charts that were examined.

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[redacted] the 1:500,000 charts comprised the only uniform series used in Czechoslovakia, although he had heard in the fall of 1952 that a new series at 1:250,000 was to be published.

The approach and landing charts vary in scale from 1:12,000 to 1:250,000 and provide coverage for most of the important civil airfields and their environs. Many of the charts are merely parts of older topographic maps on which aeronautical information of 1946 or 1947 (corrected to 1950 in a few cases) has been superimposed. Some of the charts are accompanied by recently corrected data sheets giving approved letdown procedures and other information. The latest date found on any of these sheets was 4 December 1952. Most of the charts at 1:25,000 carry crudely drawn inset maps at 1:3,600 that present aerodrome data. In general, the approach and landing coverage seems adequate for its special purpose. The landing charts, however, include considerable superfluous physical and cultural information.

The Polish charts that became available for examination include 9 sheets, all at the scale of 1:500,000, which provide coverage for approximately 75 percent of Poland. Published by the Wojskowy Instytut Geograficzny (Military Geographic Institute) since World War II, the base maps present data from original Polish surveys and foreign sources. Relief (indicated by contours), forested areas, hydrographic data, and cultural features are clearly shown. Two editions were apparently published. One has a 1948 aeronautical overprint, on which civil airfields, spot heights, and towns are outlined in conspicuous red and the rivers and lakes are emphasized with dark blue, and includes a hypsometric inset map at 1:3,000,000, on which isogonic lines are superimposed. The other edition, which is of uncertain postwar date, has no red and blue overprint and presents isogonic lines on the body of the chart rather than on an inset.

Although the charts include no information on radio facilities or air-traffic regulations, they are adequate for dead-reckoning and pilotage navigation. Presumably, data on air and radio installations are disseminated throughout the Polish Air Force on a "need to know" basis. The small size of the force would make this feasible, and the procedure would have much to recommend it from the points of view of both security and economy (e.g., frequent code changes could be made without necessitating chart revision).

The Czech charts at 1:500,000 seem more suitable for aeronautical use than the Polish charts, which are mere adaptations of topographic maps. Although the Polish 1:500,000 charts and some of the Czech approach and landing charts appear makeshift when compared with coverage at similar scales produced in the United States, this does not necessarily mean that the cartographic capabilities of Poland and Czechoslovakia have declined markedly. More likely, it simply means that neither civil nor military flying in Czechoslovakia and Poland is at present sufficiently extensive to require elaborate, specialized charts.

Nothing on the charts that have become available indicates standardization of aeronautical coverage for the Soviet Orbit countries. The Soviet program for coordinated mapping in eastern Europe discussed elsewhere in this issue may, however, eventually bring about a degree of Orbit-wide uniformity. (SECRET)

AREAS IN RUMANIA ACCESSIBLE TO WESTERN DIPLOMATS UNDER NEW TRAVEL REGULATIONS

The rules governing diplomatic travel that became effective in Rumania on 25 October 1953 materially altered the pattern of free and prohibited areas that had been in effect for over 4 years. The new accessible and forbidden zones and the types of travel allowed over certain routes are indicated on the accompanying map (CIA map 13009). Superficial comparison of the new and old regulations suggests that the new arrangement amounts to a relaxation of restrictions, but a careful weighing of the new rules indicates an actual worsening of the travel situation. The severe limitation on auto travel greatly reduces the opportunities for observation and will generally prevent visits to all but a few of the larger cities in the "free zone." In the matter of rail travel, the new rules are somewhat more liberal than the former ones, but experience has shown that train travel offers limited opportunities for observation. (For example, as a rule only one side of the right-of-way can be seen, and visibility may be greatly curtailed by rain, smoke, or dirty windows.) Several questions regarding the limits of the accessible cities situated in the forbidden zone and the use that diplomats may make of local transportation facilities in cities reached by air or train have not yet been satisfactorily answered by the Rumanian Government.

The new regulations mean that Rumania will be the least accessible of the four European Satellite countries with which the United States maintains diplomatic relations. Although advance notice of time and itinerary of proposed trips must be given, Poland and Czechoslovakia offer Western diplomats virtual countrywide freedom of auto travel. On 10 August 1953, the regulations governing diplomatic travel in Hungary were eased, making the situation somewhat similar to that in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In Rumania, the surveillance and harassment to which traveling diplomats have been subjected have varied from time to time and place to place, following no clear-cut pattern. Under the old travel rules, militia patrols sometimes prevented members of the diplomatic corps from entering areas identified as "free" by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In some instances, this appeared to be due to the ignorance of the local militiamen, but in other cases it seemed to reflect a deliberate official attempt to discourage travel. Thus, until there is evidence of a real change in Rumanian foreign policy, it would be unwise to assume that the new travel regulations will always mean in practice substantially what they seem to mean on paper.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

GEOLOGICAL MAPPING IN POLAND

An article in Z Badan Czwartorzędu w Polsce (Quaternary Research Projects in Poland), Vol. 1, Biuletyn 65, 1952, outlines the program and accomplishments of the Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny (State Institute of Geology) for the years 1946-49. The article indicates that during that period the institute gave priority to the publication of geological maps at the scale of 1:300,000. The program was to culminate in the production of three series of 29 sheets each -- one series to show surface geology, another the geology of the substrata, and the third the distribution of mineral resources. The State Institute of Geology employed about 80 full- or part-time workers in making these maps.

The article states that 25 sheets of the surface-geology series were "completed" (published?) by the end of 1949; gives the titles of the sheets and the names of the geologists responsible for the work; and indicates the year or season in which the work was done. From this detailed information it was thought that an assessment of Polish geological mapping could be made. A study of the 18 sheets of the surface-geology series available at the U.S. Geological Survey Library, however, revealed that work on the series was initiated by the Germans in the early years of World War II and that at least two sheets had been published by 1943. The Polish State Institute of Geology continued the project after the war and by 1947 had published

several sheets, among which were the original German sheets with Polish terminology substituted for the German.

Two methods were apparently combined in the Polish work on the surface-geology series: (1) senior geologists were assigned the compilation of maps of areas with which they were familiar through former study or field work, and (2) experienced geologists directed work groups of 5 to 17 persons in field work and compilation for areas for which data were not already assembled. Many of the group workers were apparently students who thus earned academic credit. By organizing the work in this way, the Poles were able to achieve the completion of most of the sheets of the series in the 4-year period 1946-49.

Progress on the substrata maps was not nearly so spectacular. This series, like the one on surface geology, was started during World War II by the Germans, who had completed much of the field work by 1944. Six Polish sheets, believed to be based to some extent on German work, have been published, and three of these are available at the U.S. Geological Survey Library. Most of the borehole records necessary for completion of this series were destroyed during the war. Some 12,000 new borehole profiles were collected between 1946 and 1949, but little progress was made in analyzing the data for presentation in map form.

The Poles have reportedly completed 5 of the 29 sheets of the series showing the distribution of mineral resources. Since two



sheets of the German series on the mineral resources of Poland are available in the U.S. Geological Survey Library, it can be assumed that at least two of the "new" Polish sheets are based wholly or in part on the German work. The fact that so few of the mineral-resources sheets have been published may be attributable to the concentration of effort on the surface-geology maps. On the other hand, the work may have been delayed until after all data on surface and substrata geology have been collected, when a more accurate portrayal of the distribution of mineral resources could be made.

The article provides a revealing glimpse of Polish work in a field that has not been well publicized. Since it completely ignores known German contributions to the three 1:300,000 series, however, the article does not offer a basis for appraisal of Polish capabilities in the field of geologic mapping. (CONFIDENTIAL)

RUMANIAN ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

The first complete listing of the current Rumanian administrative divisions to become available in Washington has recently been received in the CIA Map Library. The list is contained in a directory, Impartirea Administrativ-Economica a Republicii Populare Române (Administrative-Economic Divisions of the Rumanian People's Republic), which gives the first-, second-, and third-order administrative divisions and their component towns and villages as established by Decree No. 113 of 19 September 1952.

A comparison of the directory with the CIA map of Rumanian administrative divisions published in May 1953 in Map Intelligence Review MR-36 indicated a number of inaccuracies in the map. In particular, the assumption that a raion (second-order division) takes the name of its administrative center was shown to be erroneous. Also, the official spelling of several Rumanian place names differed from the forms used on the map, which were those approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names. The 1953 map of Rumanian administrative divisions has therefore been revised to incorporate the data from the official directory. The revised version of CIA map 12479 accompanies this article, and additional copies are available from the CIA Map Library. (UNCLASSIFIED)

A NEW MAP OF HUNGARY

One of the very few postwar maps of Hungary that have been sold to the public in that country without restriction has recently become available in the United States (CIA Map Library Call No. 85884). The multicolored map, entitled Magyarország (Hungary), is at the scale of 1:1,250,000 and is believed to have been published in 1952 or 1953. The sheet measures approximately 17 x 10 inches and was apparently intended for school use, which may account for its unrestricted distribution in Hungary. The presentation is noteworthy for the land-use information and the numerous regional place names included. A transportation and a hypsometric map of Hungary, each at 1:2,000,000, appear on the reverse side.

Four categories of land use (arable land, vineyards, grazing land, and forests) are shown by means of distinctive colors or patterns. A spot check of the data against available information revealed no significant departures from prewar land-use practices.

The names of the main physical features and large regions are presented very clearly on the 1:2,000,000 hypsometric map, and those of some of the large regions and many subregions are given on the main map. Many of these are names often encountered in reports and Hungarian publications but rarely shown on maps.

Nonquantitative symbols are used to locate mines (coal, iron, manganese, and bauxite), petroleum-producing areas, metallurgical plants,

sugar refineries, power-plants, and textile, leather, and paper factories. Most of the principal mines and industries are located, although some installations known to be important are omitted. Background data include transportation features, hydrography, first-order civil-division boundaries, and a selection of place names commensurate with the scale.

In presenting the names of towns in border areas of adjacent countries, local official forms are given in bold-face type, with the Hungarian names appearing below in small type. This method of treating names would have been deemed treasonable by Hungarian Irredentists of the period between tne two World Wars, but it presumably follows present Soviet policy in making a show of friendliness toward neighboring "people's democracies." (UNCLASSIFIED)

CPYRGHT



SUPPLEMENT TO 1952 HUNGARIAN GAZETTEER

A supplement to the Magyarország Helységnévtára 1952 (Hungary -- Geographical Dictionary), published by the Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Central Statistical Office), Budapest, 1953, has recently been received in the United States.* The volume (Hungarian title Pótfüzet) is particularly valuable for the data it gives on changes in place names and administrative units since the 1952 gazetteer was published. Noteworthy among the changes are a reduction in the number of districts (one less in both Baranya and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén counties) and an increase in the number of towns responsible directly to the district or county councils.

The supplement is divided into four major parts. The first gives alphabetically, according to administrative rank, the names of the counties (vármegyék), districts (járások), towns (városok), and communes (községek). The second part comprises an alphabetical list of new communes, including under each the names of the inhabited places within its limits. Data on bus, train, postal, and telecommunication services are given for the commune seat and for each constituent community. The third part brings up to date the information on postal, transportation, and telecommunication services for the communes and towns. Each entry is cross-referenced by page and

*A short article on the 1952 gazetteer appeared in Map Intelligence Review 36, May 1953.

town number to the 1952 gazetteer. The fourth part records the changes in the names of towns and other administrative units. Corresponding new and old town and commune names are given in two lists, one alphabetized by the new name and the other by the old. The names of settlements and civil divisions that have been combined to form new towns are noted, and the year each new community was established is indicated.

The use of the supplement in conjunction with the 1952 gazetteer should give the current official form for any town or civil-division name likely to appear on maps or in reports. Although no maps accompany the supplement, available maps can be used to interpret most of the data.

A microfilm copy of the supplement from which legible paper prints can be made is available in the CIA Library [redacted] 25X1A [redacted]. (UNCLASSIFIED)

25X1A

NEW CZECHOSLOVAK ATLAS RECEIVED

A newly received paper-bound atlas, Československo v Mapách (Czechoslovakia in Maps), Orbis, Praha, 1952 (CIA Call No. A-F-302.06 (1952)), is one of the few Czechoslovak atlases or atlas-like volumes that have become available since World War II. The work is apparently intended for school use. It is of value principally for maps showing current first- and second-order administrative units.

The first of the three sections in the volume includes textual information on hydrography, climate, and fauna, as well as tables giving land-use data for the Czech lands, Slovakia, and the country as a whole. A check of the land-use information revealed no noteworthy departures from prewar patterns. The population (including density), area, and administrative center of each kraj (region) are given in tabular form. The population figures appear to be from the 1948 census, rounded out to the nearest thousand.

The second section is a short gazetteer giving the names of populated places, rivers, and mountains. Settlements listed include villages with populations over 100. Locations are indicated by grid references to the kraj maps in the last section.

The third section consists of a series of 19 maps at the scale of 1:900,000, one for each of the 19 kraje. These maps show the changes that have been made in okres (district) boundaries since 1949 and are the best maps available on this subject. On the flyleaf of

the atlas is a sketch map on which the kraje are outlined and keyed by number to an accompanying list of kraje and their respective okresy. The remaining maps in the third section are at the scale of 1:4,500,000 and present generalized data on agriculture, forests, mineral resources, and population density. The minerals map is fairly complete, although singularly free of information on uranium mines. (UNCLASSIFIED)

LATEST AVAILABLE CIVIL-DIVISION MAPS OF THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES PUBLISHED BY CIA

The latest available CIA-published maps showing civil divisions of the Satellite countries are noted below, along with brief comments on their content and reliability.

Albania

Albania Administrative Divisions, 1:1,500,000, 1951, CIA 11744. Shows first-order units only, as of 1950. May be completely obsolete, since 1953 reports refer to a reduction in the number of "districts" from 25 to 10.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria, 1:2,000,000, 1953, CIA 11395 (first revision). Shows first-order divisions only, as of 1953. Internal boundaries are of no more than schematic accuracy.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia Administrative Divisions, 1:1,030,000, August 1953, CIA 12665. Shows first- and second-order divisions. The data are believed to be correct to the present.

Hungary

A Magyar Népköztársaság (The Hungarian People's Republic), 1:600,000, 1951, CIA 9226. Shows first-order units only. The data are believed to current.

Poland

Poland Administrative Divisions, 1:1,250,000, 1952, CIA 11780. Shows first- and second-order units as of December 1951. There have been changes in the boundaries of approximately 10 second-order divisions since the map was compiled.

Rumania

Rumania Administrative Divisions, 1:2,000,000, 1954, CIA 12479 (first revision). Shows first- and second-order units as of September 1952. Internal boundaries are current, although of no more than schematic accuracy. A copy of the map is included in this issue of the Geographic Intelligence Review.

(CONFIDENTIAL)